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WILL I GET FIRED FOR POSTING THIS?: ENCOURAGING THE 
USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE 
PICKERING BALANCING TEST  
Lilli B. Wofsy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In the Nineteenth Century, it was thought that while “[a person] 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, . . . he ha[d] no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”1  The Supreme Court repudiated 
this proposition in its influential Pickering v. Board of Education decision 
by declaring that public employees do not relinquish all of their free 
speech rights when working for the government.2  In Pickering, the 
Court established a balancing test to determine whether the First 
Amendment protects a public employee’s speech: a balance must be 
achieved to protect a public employee commenting on matters of public 
concern and a public employer’s concern in promoting workplace 
efficiency.3  Since the Pickering decision in 1968, the Court has further 
elaborated on the applicable requirements, holding that government 
employees enjoy First Amendment protections only when speaking as 
private citizens4 and on matters of public concern.5   
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 1 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 2 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
 5 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
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But while the Pickering framework dates back over fifty years, it 
predates the era of social media.6  Since the law predates social media, 
the current framework should be supplemented with an instruction to 
government employers that they should develop concise social media 
policies to protect their employees’ rights. 
Over the turn of the century, the internet has become a “digital 
marketplace of ideas.”7  Stemming from the popularity of the internet, 
social networking services such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter 
have emerged.8  These interactive sites allow users to create online 
profiles and connect with other users online.9  Users can post content 
online while also having the ability to alter or delete their postings 
immediately.10  As of 2019, the average American spent two hours and 
three minutes per day on social media.11   
Employers have a substantial interest in what their employees post 
on social media.  In terms of hiring, seventy percent of employers check 
social media accounts when reviewing job candidates.12  Employers are 
understandably concerned with their employees’ social media accounts, 
potentially subjecting employers to liability or increasing the 
probability of reputational damage.13  On the other hand, employees 
often believe that their social media accounts are private, despite their 
co-workers’, employers’, and the general public’s potential ability to 
access these accounts.14  One of the consequences of these conflicting 
 
 6 See Mark Schroeder, Keeping the Free in Teacher Speech Rights: Protecting 
Teachers and Their Use of Social Media to Communicate with Students Beyond the 
Schoolhouse Gates, 19 RICH J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2012). 
 7 Benjamin Good, Google and Twitter Speak up in Support of the First Amendment 
Rights of Their Users, ACLU (Jan. 20, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
speech/internet-speech/google-and-twitter-speak-support-first-amendment-rights-
their-users. 
 8 See, e.g., About, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/ (last visited July 30, 2020); About 
Us, INSTAGRAM, about.instagram.com/about-us (last visited July 30, 2020); Our company, 
TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited July 30, 2020). 
 9 JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL 
MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 18–19 (2010). 
 10 ADAM COHEN, SOCIAL MEDIA: LEGAL RISK AND CORPORATE POLICY 57 (2013). 
 11 J. Clement, Daily Social Media Usage Worldwide 2012-2019, STATISTA (Feb. 26, 
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/433871/daily-social-media-worldwide/. 
 12 Saige Driver, Keep It Clean: Social Media Screenings Gain in Popularity, BUSINESS 
NEWS DAILY (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2377-social-media-
hiring.html.  
 13 Nina Krüger et al., A Framework for Enterprise Social Media Guidelines 1 (2013), 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1578&context=amcis2013&httpsr
edir=1&referer=; Frank E. Langan, Note, Likes and Retweets Can’t Save Your Job: Public 
Employee Privacy, Free Speech, and Social Media, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 228, 230 (2018).   
 14 See Langan, supra note 13, at 230. 
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interests is an absence of a clear consensus over what social media 
content deserves constitutional protection as “speech.”15 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving the free 
speech claims of a public employee disciplined for posting content on a 
social media site.  In a 2017 decision, however, the Court nonetheless 
hinted at an inclination to afford special treatment to social media use.16  
Specifically, in Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Kennedy described 
social media as “the modern public square”;17 that is, “perhaps the most 
powerful mechanism[] available to a private citizen to make his or her 
voice heard[,]” by providing the ability to spread one’s voice to a greater 
amount of people.18  He further noted that while the great revolution 
sparked by the Cyber Age could not have been foreseen at its developing 
stage, it nonetheless bore emphasizing that to deny an individual’s 
access to social media would prevent the user from “engaging in the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”19 
The Packingham Court did not address the First Amendment 
standards for evaluating government employees’ free speech claims.  As 
such, cases continue to arise in which public employers discipline their 
employees for speech made on social media accounts.  Thus, this 
Comment advances a series of proposals for the future application of the 
Pickering test to public employees’ free speech claims.  Section II 
discusses the influential Pickering v. Board of Education decision and its 
development over time.  Section III focuses on an ongoing circuit split 
regarding one particular aspect of the Pickering analysis—namely, the 
question of whether the employer must demonstrate that the 
employee’s speech caused actual disruption or instead merely 
demonstrate a reasonable belief that the speech could have caused 
disruption.  Section IV proposes a resolution to this circuit split, arguing 
that the reasonable belief of disruption test, while flawed, is the correct 
test to apply.  Section V proposes that the Court incentivize employers 
to adopt social media policies as a resolution for issues stemming from 
the reasonable belief of disruption test, while simultaneously protecting 
the interests of both employers and employees.  
 
 
 15 See e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 16 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
 17 Id. at 1737. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 1736–37. 
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II.  FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF EMPLOYEE’S SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has offered some guidance for courts when 
dealing with cases brought by employees alleging violations of their 
First Amendment rights when they were terminated because of some 
form of speech.20  There is no definitive answer for the correct level of 
disruption an employer must demonstrate to support its decision to fire 
an employee.21  This section first discusses background law concerning 
the First Amendment and protections offered to public employees.  
Next, this section sets forth the applicable legal framework when public 
employees bring suit because their employers have allegedly violated 
their First Amendment rights.  Finally, this section addresses the 
Supreme Court’s lack of uniformity in determining the correct level of 
disruption an employer is required to demonstrate when protecting 
their termination decision. 
A.  The First Amendment and the Freedom of Speech   
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”22  Courts 
have interpreted the Amendment’s guarantee of “the freedom of 
speech” to mean that employers cannot unreasonably restrict an 
individual’s ability to speak, write, or freely spread ideas.23  These 
protections extend to the domain of government employment.  A public 
employee is described as a person “employed in a department 
responsible for conducting the affairs of a national or local 
 
 20 Compare Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 715–16 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he government must introduce evidence of an actual disruption of its services 
resulting from the speech at issue.”), and Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 
1999) (stating the employer must demonstrate proof of “real, not imagined” disruption), 
and Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The government must 
produce evidence of an actual disruption of services which results from the employee’s 
speech.”), with Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating 
employers do not need to offer proof of actual disruption, but rather that an adverse 
effect would be reasonably apprehended), and Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 686 (6th Cir. 
2017) (affording deference to employer’s prediction of disruption), and Munroe v. Cent. 
Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The government need not show the 
existence of actual disruption if it establishes that disruption is likely to occur because 
of the speech.”). 
 21 Id.  The Supreme Court has constantly alternated between whether to require 
proof that the employee’s speech actually disrupted the workforce, or that the employee 
had a reasonable belief that disruption could occur before terminating the employee.  Id. 
 22 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 23 Freedom of Speech, BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY (2012). 
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government.”24  The Court has held that when a citizen becomes a 
government employee, the person takes on a “dual status” as an 
employee and citizen, but often the employee’s free speech rights will 
be significantly less robust than those extended to citizens.25   
B.  First Amendment Supreme Court Decisions in the Employment 
Context  
The Supreme Court has developed a legal framework governing 
public employee speech claims over time.26  The Supreme Court has 
dictated that to be constitutionally protected, an employee’s speech 
must address a matter of public concern, and the public employee’s First 
Amendment interest must not be outweighed by the employer’s interest 
in promoting workplace efficiency.27  While these two requirements 
may seem simple on their face, they have caused considerable confusion 
within the lower courts.28 
Before the 1960s, the widespread belief was that the First 
Amendment’s protection did not in any way extend to public employees’ 
speech.29  In 1968, the Supreme Court uprooted this view in Pickering v. 
Board of Education.30  In Pickering, the plaintiff, a school teacher, was 
dismissed by the board of education after he sent a letter to a local 
newspaper criticizing the way the board and the district superintendent 
addressed previous proposals to raise school revenues.31  Rather than 
reject the free speech claim outright, the Court proceeded to apply a 
balancing test.32  The test was intended to weigh the competing 
objectives of safeguarding a public employee’s interest in commenting 
 
 24 Civil Servant, BLACK’S L. DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  It is important to note that this 
Comment focuses on the disadvantages and barricades public employees must 
overcome when posting on social media.  Private employers can restrict employees’ 
speech without violating the First Amendment.  See John Q. Mulligan, Note, Huppert, 
Reilly, and the Increasing Futility of Relying on the First Amendment to Protect Employee 
Speech, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 449, 460 (2010) (finding that a major flaw with the 
First Amendment protection offered by the Supreme Court is that the “First Amendment 
protections do not apply to private employees.”). 
 25 Langan, supra note 13, at 228. 
 26 Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 27 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
 28 See infra Section 0. 
 29 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892) (holding that the policeman had a constitutional 
right to discuss politics, but lacked a constitutional right to be a police officer). 
 30 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 31 Id. at 564. 
 32 Id. at 568. 
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on matters of public concern against the public employer’s interest in 
promoting workplace efficiency.33   
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Supreme Court added a further 
wrinkle to the analysis.34  In Connick v. Myers, the Court made clear that 
the Pickering test applies only when the employee’s speech touches on 
a “matter of public concern.”35  The Court cautioned that “[w]hen 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, 
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their 
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the 
First Amendment.”36  The Court further clarified that when looking at a 
statement to determine whether it addresses a matter of public concern, 
such a statement will not be “considered in a vacuum”; rather, the 
statement will be evaluated in context by considering the manner, time, 
and place of the employee’s speech.37  
When balancing the interests of the employer against the interests 
of the employee, the Court has identified several factors worth 
considering.38  For example, in Rankin v. McPherson, the Court suggested 
that it might matter whether the employee’s speech (1) “impairs 
discipline by supervisors”; (2) “impairs . . . harmony among co-
workers”; (3) “has a detrimental impact on close working relationships 
for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary”; (4) “impedes 
the performance of the speaker’s duties”; (5) “interferes with the 
regular operation of the enterprise”; (6) “undermines the mission of the 
public employer”; (7) is information communicated in private; (8) 
conflicts with “the responsibilities of the employee within the agency”; 
and (9) abuses the “authority and public accountability the employee’s 
role entails.”39  But in identifying these factors in Rankin, the Court did 
not make clear whether the employer needed to show the presence of 
 
 33 Id.  
 34 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 146. 
 37 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Connick, 461 U.S.  
at 152–53). 
 38 Id. at 388–91. 
 39 Id.  The Pickering Court had “previously recognized as pertinent considerations 
whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, 
has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and 
confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or 
interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.”  Id. at 388 (citing Pickering v. 
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570–73 (1968)). 
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actual disruption or a mere reasonable fear that such disruption might 
come to pass.40  
C.  Supreme Court’s Lack of Clarity over Disruption Test  
The disruption test’s ambiguity has caused lower courts to be 
conflicted over whether the employer must demonstrate that the 
employee’s speech actually disrupted the workplace or that the 
employee had a reasonable fear of disruption to justify preemptively 
terminating a public employee based on his or her speech.41  Initially, in 
Pickering, the Court’s language appeared to require proof of actual 
disruption, finding that while the teacher made inaccurate public 
statements condemning his employer, the statements were “neither 
shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the 
teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to 
have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.”42  
Since Pickering, however, the Supreme Court has offered conflicting 
opinions regarding this decision.  
For example, the Connick decision complicated Pickering’s initial 
stance by holding that the state’s burden of proof “varies depending 
upon the nature of the employee’s expression.”43  The Court explained 
that matters substantially involving public concern require a closer 
showing of actual disruption, whereas speech expressing a less 
significant public concern requires a lesser showing of disruption.44  
Four years later, the Rankin decision revisited Pickering but failed to 
determine the necessary level of disruption.45  The Court followed 
Pickering’s method by looking for evidence that the employee’s speech 
had actually interfered with the office’s functionality.46 
By 1994, the Court further exacerbated the confusion with its 
plurality opinion in Waters v. Churchill.47  In Waters, the plurality gave 
“substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions 
 
 40 See Richard Renner, Retaliation—Public Employees and First Amendment Rights, 
WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://workplacefairness.org/retaliation-public-employees#1 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019), where the factors are described as “vague and subjective,” 
which can be a hint toward understanding why confusion exists over what type of 
disruption an employer must demonstrate that the employee caused to tip the scales. 
 41 See infra Section 0. 
 42 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968). 
 43 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). 
 44 Id. at 152. 
 45 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
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of disruption.”48  By 2006, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court further 
alluded to, but did not explicitly state, the idea that the employer may 
restrict employees if the speech has the potential to affect its 
operations.49  That most recent language on the subject perhaps 
indicates that the Court would likely apply the reasonable belief of 
disruption standard, but the issue is far from settled.   
These conflicts are only intensified in the realm of social media 
usage.  For example, if a doctor working for a state-owned hospital 
makes a comment on her Facebook account that demonstrates that she 
is against abortions, should the hospital be required to demonstrate that 
her post actually disrupted the workforce, or would it be enough to 
show a reasonable belief that disruption could have occurred shortly 
after she released her post?  The usage of a social media outlet versus a 
newspaper or alternate channel of communication allows the doctor’s 
language to be shared and questioned by people beyond the doctor’s 
jurisdiction or realm.50  The potential effects of this realistic 
hypothetical emphasize the need for the Supreme Court to provide 
further guidance.  
III.  PICKERING’S UNCLARIFIED BALANCING TEST REQUIRES PREDICTABILITY 
AMONG COURTS 
There is a lack of clarity within the lower courts as to whether 
Pickering and subsequent Supreme Court decisions require public 
employers to offer proof of actual disruption or merely a reasonable 
belief that the speech would have caused disruption.  As a result, 
employees may face very different fates depending on the jurisdiction 
they are in.51  This section explores the circuit split and illustrates that 
the reasonable belief of disruption standard has been utilized by more 
states, specifically in cases dealing with speech stemming from social 
media usage.  
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“A government entity has broader 
discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it 
imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s 
operations.”). 
 50 See Ute Krudewagen & Lisa Stem, Global Employee Terminations in The Age of 
Social Media, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2011, 3:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/267
702?scroll=1.  
 51 It has been argued that courts that require proof of actual disruption tend to rule 
in the public employee’s favor, while courts that do not require such proof often rule in 
favor of the public employer.  See Lindsay A. Hitz, Note, Protecting Blogging: The Need 
for an Actual Disruption Standard in Pickering, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1151, 1175 (2010). 
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A.  Distinguishing Between Actual Disruption and Reasonable Belief 
of Disruption 
The Pickering balancing test requires courts to perform a fact-
sensitive inquiry that considers the time, place, and manner of the 
speech.52  After Pickering’s holding and its progeny, circuit courts are 
split over whether a public employer must make a showing of actual 
disruption53 or reasonable belief of future disruption caused by its 
employee’s speech to justify terminating an employee.54  
The Tenth Circuit has been an advocate for requiring employers to 
provide proof of actual disruption.55  As envisioned by that court, the 
actual disruption test would require the government to demonstrate, 
before terminating an employee, how that employee’s speech actually 
disrupted the workforce.56  This test would provide more certainty for 
both employees and employers, by allowing employees to predict 
whether their speech will be protected and by providing employers a 
definitive line of what constitutes as terminable behavior.57  In Melton v. 
City of Oklahoma City, the Tenth Circuit found that even though the 
employee’s speech could impact workplace efficiency, the government 
“must introduce evidence of an actual disruption of its services resulting 
from the speech at issue.”58  The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed this point in 
its subsequent decision in Schalk v. Gallemore by requiring the employer 
 
 52 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
 53 See Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 715–16 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
government must introduce evidence of an actual disruption of its services resulting 
from the speech at issue.”); Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating 
the employer must demonstrate proof of “real, not imagined” disruption); Schalk v. 
Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The government must produce 
evidence of an actual disruption of services which results from the employee’s speech.”). 
 54 See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating 
employers do not need to offer proof of actual disruption, but rather that an adverse 
effect would be reasonably apprehended); Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 686 (6th Cir. 
2017) (affording deference to employer’s prediction of disruption); Munroe v. Cent. 
Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The government need not show the 
existence of actual disruption if it establishes that disruption is likely to occur because 
of the speech.”). 
 55 See Melton, 879 F.2d at 715–16; Schalk, 906 F.2d at 496. 
 56 Langan, supra note 13, at 246–47. 
 57 Emily McNee, Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First Amendment Protections for 
Teachers in the Digital Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1818, 1847 (2013) (discussing the Pickering 
balancing test as applied to school districts and their employees).  
 58 Melton, 879 F.2d at 715–16. 
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to offer proof that the contested speech actually disrupted its 
workplace.59  
The Eighth Circuit has also evaluated employer testimony and 
evidence to find proof demonstrating an employee’s speech actually 
disrupted the workplace.60  In Morgan v. Robinson, the court found there 
was evidence that a former employee’s campaign statements made 
while running for sheriff actually disrupted the office.61  The court 
looked to the employer’s testimony that emphasized that the 
employee’s statements were “detrimental to the office, harmful to 
morale, and adversely impacted the public’s trust of the office.”62  The 
court also found that the employee violated the administration’s and 
other employees’ trust and created office disharmony, which further 
proved that actual disruption occurred.63  The court found this evidence 
sufficient to justify the employer’s decision to terminate the employee.64  
The Eighth Circuit, however, has not definitively determined that 
employers must proffer evidence of actual disruption but has also found 
that an employer’s reasonable belief that a disruption could occur 
justifies terminating an employee.65 
The majority of circuits recently rejected the actual disruption 
standard, requiring instead that the employer show that it had a 
reasonable belief that disruption could result from the contested 
speech.66  For example, in Munroe v. Central Bucks School District, the 
Third Circuit analyzed whether a teacher’s personal blog, which 
contained several posts that negatively portrayed her students, should 
be protected under the First Amendment.67  Upon the teacher’s 
dissemination of defamatory information to the public through her blog, 
the school district received over 200 requests from parents to opt their 
children out of having the teacher; this forced the board to hire another 
 
 59 Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 401, 496 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Nunez v. Davis, 
169 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring proof of “real, not imaged disruption” by 
the public employer to support its termination decision). 
 60 See Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 61 Id. at 522, 526. 
 62 Id. at 525. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 526.   
 65 Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(finding that employers do not need to offer evidence of actual disruption in all cases, 
but rather courts can look to the government entity’s “prediction[] of harm”) (quoting 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion)). 
 66 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 685 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The Second, Third, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have each held that evidence of actual disruption is 
not required.”). 
 67 Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 457–58 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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teacher to teach the same schedule as the teacher at issue.68  Even 
though there was ample evidence that the teacher’s speech disrupted 
the workplace, the court declared that the employer did not need to 
demonstrate actual disruption to justify terminating the teacher.69  
Rather, the court ruled that the employer only needed to demonstrate 
“that disruption [wa]s likely to occur because of the speech,”70 and held 
that the blog impeded the teacher’s ability to perform her job and 
interfered with the school district’s ability to operate regularly, thus 
satisfying the reasonable belief of disruption standard.71 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has affirmatively established that there 
exists no “necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the 
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working 
relationships is manifest before taking action.”72  In Gillis v. Miller, the 
plaintiffs, former correctional facility officers, drafted a memorandum 
informing the jail staff of their rights during a management 
investigation.73  The memorandum had explicitly advised correctional 
officers to have a union representative present before speaking to 
management and provided the officers with instructions on what to say 
during their questioning.74  The court held that the department could 
have reasonably predicted the memorandum would disrupt the 
“legitimate law enforcement interests” by hindering its ability to 
complete a thorough management investigation.75   
B.  The Disruption Standard Evaluated in Cases Stemming from 
Social Media 
Lower courts have also tried to apply the Supreme Court 
framework to cases dealing with social media speech.  Many circuit 
courts have applied the reasonable belief of disruption test.76  In 
Liverman v. City of Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit found that social media 
 
 68 Id. at 462. 
 69 Id. at 472. 
 70 Id.  See also Lewis v. Cohen, 165 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 71 Munroe, 805 F.3d at 478.  While the Third Circuit did not require proof of actual 
disruption, there was substantial proof that the teacher’s blog actually disrupted the 
school district, i.e., the need to hire a new teacher and the receipt of over 200 “opt-out” 
requests from parents.  Id. 
 72 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anzaldua v. Ne. 
Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2015)). 
 73 Id. at 681. 
 74 Id. at 687. 
 75 Id. 
 76 But see Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding proof of 
actual disruption caused by the deputy’s statements because they were “detrimental to 
the office, harmful to morale, and adversely impacted the public’s trust of the office”). 
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use “fits comfortably” within the Pickering balancing test because “[a] 
social media platform amplifies the distribution of the speaker’s 
message—which favors the employee’s free speech interests—but also 
increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental 
disruption, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in efficiency.”77  The 
court’s explanation of the Pickering balancing test, as applied to social 
media cases, exposes the heightened risks that social media speech 
poses to both employers and employees.78  By applying the reasonable 
belief test to social media speech based on social media platforms’ 
potential amplifying effect—which may not always exist—courts, more 
than ever, are left searching for what would qualify as protected speech. 
Before getting into the mechanics of the reasonable belief of 
disruption test, one preliminary point bears emphasis: social media 
enables “speech” and communication through various sometimes-
subtle means.  In particular, social media allows users to post, comment, 
and select “like” or “dislike” options to other users’ posts, thus engaging 
in behavior that courts have deemed sufficiently speech-like to 
implicate free speech protections.79  For example, the Fourth Circuit has 
characterized the clicking of a “like” button, also commonly known as 
“liking,” as a form of speech, similar to a making a post on Facebook.80  
“Liking” a social media post or comment has been perceived as 
connecting the user with content he or she agrees with or cares about.81  
In Grutzmacher v. Howard County, a fire department’s battalion chief’s 
Facebook activity led to the court upholding his termination by the 
department.82  The chief had initially posted on his personal Facebook 
page about killing liberals.83  Subsequently, he “liked” a racially charged 
comment, which was written by another user, on his original post.84  
After receiving emails to remove posts inconsistent with the 
 
 77 See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 80 Id. at 386. 
 81 See Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bland v. 
Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, at 2–3 (E.D. Va. 2012) (No. 12-1671). 
 82 Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 83 Id. at 338.  The battalion chief’s Facebook post read, “My aide had an outstanding 
idea . . . lets [sic] all kill someone with a liberal . . . then maybe we can get them outlawed 
too!  Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal to death with another liberal . . . its [sic] 
almost poetic . . . .”  Id. 
 84 Id.  The comment by a voluntary paramedic read, “But . . . was it an ‘assault liberal’!  
Gotta pick a fat one, those are the ‘high capacity’ ones.  Oh . . .  pick a black one, those are 
more ‘scary’.  Sorry had to perfect on a cool idea!”  Id.  The former battalion chief also 
liked a post that included a photo of an elderly woman raising her middle finger and 
stating that she could post whatever she pleased on her Facebook page.  Id. at 339. 
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department’s social media policy, the battalion chief wrote on his 
Facebook page that he took down the original post to “prevent future 
butthurt and comply with a directive from my supervisor.”85  
Meanwhile, the “liking” of the racist Facebook comment caused African-
American employees to reach out to a constituent group that 
represented minority firefighters.86  As a result, one employee was no 
longer willing to work under the chief.87  These and other examples 
illustrate the pervasiveness of “speech”-like options that social media 
sites enable.  And in light of that fact, the need to develop a workable and 
sensible “disruption” test for employee speech on social media becomes 
even more apparent.  
The Grutzmacher decision illuminates the impact social media 
usage can have on public employees.  While the battalion chief’s 
termination was based on a compilation of his actions, the court held 
that his “liking” of another’s racially charged comment constituted a 
form of speech that infringed on the department’s overall ability to 
make fair decisions.88  Regardless of the battalion chief’s morality, the 
court’s interpretation of his “like” as speech demonstrates the 
expansion of the concept of speech from what was originally applied 
when the Pickering framework was developed.89  The Supreme Court 
denied cert of this case in Buker v. Howard County, thereby leaving 
untouched this guiding principle that “liking” an online post can 
constitute a form of speech for employment termination purposes.90 
The public is often able to view an individual’s Facebook posts and 
likes.  In this past year, a district court even considered whether private 
Facebook messages are relevant to prove the disruption element.91  In 
Moreau v. St. Landry Parish Fire Department, the plaintiff was a fire 
captain who had posted on his Facebook page about a school teacher 
being arrested after questioning the school board about a raise for the 
superintendent.92  In the post, the fire captain compared the board’s 
actions to those of his fire department.93  The fire captain went on to 
have a “private Facebook message exchange,” where he continued to 
 
 85 Id. at 338. 
 86 Id. at 346. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 347. 
 89 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (speech considered by the 
Court was a letter written by a former school teacher).  
 90 See Buker v. Howard Cty., No. 16-1539, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5570 (2017). 
 91 See Moreau v. St. Landry Par. Fire Dist. No. 3, 413 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. La. 2019), 
aff’d, 808 F. App’x 225 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 92 Id. at 556. 
 93 Id. at 556–57. 
WOFSY (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  11:15 PM 
272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:259 
discuss the fire department with another user.94  In denying his motion 
to strike the private Facebook message exchange, the court found this 
evidence to be significant in determining whether he was terminated in 
violation of his First Amendment rights.95   
Rather than strictly looking at what was publicly available through 
an individual’s Facebook page, the court also considered an individual’s 
private messages.96  The same type of conversation could have occurred 
in the comments on the original Facebook post, but instead the parties 
used a private forum.  While this decision leaves employees more 
vulnerable to termination for conversations they privately have through 
electronic messages, employees could argue in litigation that they did 
not intend to disrupt their workforce by having private, rather than 
public, discussions on an online forum.  
As seen in Grutzmacher and Moreau, courts have considered 
comments that public employees do not explicitly express to the public, 
such as clicking a “like” button on another user’s content or having a 
private message conversation, when evaluating whether a public 
employer maintained a reasonable belief of disruption to the 
workforce.97  Since the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the 
reasonable belief of disruption test, courts should be wary about the 
growing amount of online actions that may be considered when 
evaluating whether an employer had a reasonable belief of disruption to 
justify adversely treating an employee.   
IV.  COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED REASONABLE BELIEF OF DISRUPTION 
STANDARD 
The Constitution’s framers could not have imagined that electronic 
devices would exist, much less social media platforms.98  Just as courts 
have been willing to adjust the constitutional framework over time, 
courts should also be willing to adjust the Pickering balancing test to 
simultaneously benefit the rights of employees and employers.  This 
 
 94 Id. at 559, 562. 
 95 Id. at 562–63. 
 96 It is important to note that these private Facebook messages were offered to the 
Board of Commissioners by the other party engaging in the private messages with the 
fire captain.  Id. at 558. 
 97 See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 346 (4th Cir. 2017); Moreau v. St. 
Landry Par. Fire Dist. No. 3, 413 F. Supp. 3d 556, 562 (W.D. La. 2019), aff’d, 808 F. App’x 
225 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 98 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001) (“When 
the Framers of the First Amendment prohibited Congress from making any law 
‘abridging the freedom of speech,’ they were not thinking about computers, computer 
programs, or the Internet.”). 
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section first addresses why it is necessary to revisit the disruption 
standard dilemma.  It then explains why the reasonable belief of 
disruption standard is the correct standard for application.  This section 
concludes by addressing potential flaws stemming from the reasonable 
belief of disruption standard that must be dealt with to adequately 
protect both employers’ and employees’ interests.  
A.  Why This Issue Should Be Revisited 
First Amendment retaliatory claims stemming from social media 
posts are on the rise today.99  Daniel Horwitz, a Tennessee constitutional 
lawyer, believes the reason behind the rise in these types of cases is 
social media’s visibility and widespread usage for communication.100  
Social media’s “increasingly prevalent use . . .  has created an ongoing 
tension between an employee’s right to free speech and the employer’s 
right to manage employees and operate the business.”101  Whereas the 
contested speech addressed in past Supreme Court cases dealt with 
verbal conversations or written letters, courts are now facing claims 
questioning whether social media speech should be interpreted in the 
same light.102  Cases dealing with social media content require a 
modified standard because a statement expressed through such 
mediums can be spread within moments, with exposure to the public 
being almost instantaneous.103  Because of this, courts should modify the 
current Pickering framework to protect the interests of both employers 
and employees. 
 
 
 
 
 99 David L. Hudson Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn’t 
Always Protect Government Workers, 103 ABA JOURNAL 49 (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public_employees_private_speech 
(“The number of such social media cases involving public employees disciplined for 
posts has been on the rise . . . .”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Krudewagen & Stem, supra note 50. 
 102 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (evaluating a former 
teacher’s letter); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (examining a former 
Assistant District Attorney’s questionnaire); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,  
380–81, 384 (1987) (considering a former deputy county constable’s private 
conversation); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664, 668 (1994) (looking at a former 
nurse’s conversation with a co-worker); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15 
(2006) (assessing a police officer’s witness testimony).  
 103 See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
social media “amplifies the distribution of the speaker’s message”).  
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B.  Courts Should Apply a Modified Reasonable Belief of Disruption 
Standard for Social Media Cases 
Social media is on the rise and will likely only continue to become 
more popular in the future.104  Because of social media’s ability to 
quickly disseminate information to the public, public employees’ free 
speech rights diminish under the Pickering test’s progeny, with 
employers able to satisfy a low threshold of a reasonable belief of 
disruption.  This necessitates modifying the Pickering test’s current 
application to ensure that both the rights of public employers and 
employees are adequately protected.  
The actual disruption test would adequately protect employees’ 
rights by mandating employers to demonstrate proof that the 
employee’s speech actually disrupted the workplace.105  But since many 
courts have abandoned requiring proof of actual disruption, the 
government only needs to show that there is a reasonable possibility 
that the speech could adversely harm the workforce.106  While this 
standard has flaws, the reasonable belief of disruption standard has 
received substantial support from circuit courts.107  Nonetheless, speech 
conducted through social media differs greatly from the contested 
speech once considered by the Supreme Court.108  The difference stems 
not only from the rapid dissemination of speech on social media but also 
the disintegration of the separation of public and private life due to 
oversharing on the internet.109  Public employers also react more 
quickly to employees’ social media posts because “the increased 
 
 104 See Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The rise of social media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18, 
2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media.  
 105 See Hitz, supra note 51, at 1191 (“In light of the ambiguity associated with the 
meaning of disruption in the context of Pickering, the Supreme Court must adopt a clear 
standard that lower courts can apply uniformly.”); see also Sabrina Niewialkouski, Note, 
Is Social Media the New Era’s “Water Cooler”? # NotIfYouAreAGovernmentEmployee, 70 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 963, 992 (2016) (“Courts should revert to the old test, created in 
Pickering, in which there must be an actual showing of disruption or inefficiency by the 
employee before the employer can take an adverse employment action.”).  
 106 See Snipes v. Volusia Cty., 704 F. App’x 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 107 See supra Section 0. 
 108 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15 (2006) (assessing a police officer’s 
witness testimony); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (looking at a former 
nurse’s conversation with a co-worker); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 
(1987) (considering a former deputy county constable’s private conversation); Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (examining a former Assistant District Attorney’s 
questionnaire); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (evaluating a former 
teacher’s letter). 
 109 Paul Hiebert, The Real Reason Why So Many People Overshare on Facebook, SLATE 
(Aug. 19, 2013, 10:47 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2013/08/oversharing-on-
facebook-researchers-weigh-in.html. 
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visibility of social media posts renders employers hypersensitive to 
controversy and public overreaction.”110  Subsequently, there is a need 
to modify the reasonable belief of disruption standard.   
When dealing with First Amendment cases based on social media 
activity, courts should follow the majority of circuits when applying the 
Pickering balancing test and require employers to demonstrate they had 
a reasonable belief that disruption could have occurred had they not 
acted.111  While numerous courts have expressed their desire to require 
a reasonable belief of disruption, courts have been unclear what exactly 
constitutes a reasonable belief.  Before posing a solution to the imperfect 
reasonable belief of disruption standard, there is a need to understand 
the standard’s flaws.  
C.  The Issues Stemming from the Reasonable Belief of Disruption 
Standard  
While most courts have decided that the reasonable belief of 
disruption standard is the appropriate standard to apply when deciding 
free speech claims stemming from social media activity, the standard, as 
it presently stands, has flaws that unfairly disadvantage employees.  
First, courts consistently offer employers in fields that require “close 
working relationships” an extreme amount of deference for their beliefs.  
Additionally, courts have not come to a consensus of what a reasonable 
belief of disruption entails.  This section addresses both flawed elements 
of the reasonable belief of disruption standard by looking at the root of 
the issues.  This section concludes by offering a solution to addressing 
these flaws in the future.   
1.  The Erroneous Need to Be Deferential to “Close Working 
Relationships”   
The emphasis on “close working relationships” originated in 
Pickering, where the Court found that the teacher’s work relationship 
with the board of education and superintendent were not of the nature 
that would require personal loyalty to remain functional.112  The Court 
expanded on the “close working relationship” in Connick, holding, 
“When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public 
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment 
 
 110 Alexis Martinez, Comment, The Right to be an Asshole: The Need for Increased First 
Amendment Public Employment Protections in the Age of Social Media, 27 AM. U.J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 285, 310 (2019).  
 111 But see Hudson, supra note 99 (urging courts to require employers to demonstrate 
how the workplace was “actually undermined” by the employee’s public speech). 
 112 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968). 
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is appropriate.”113  In modern case law, courts have followed in 
Connick’s footsteps by offering heightened deference to the judgment of 
particular employers when analyzing whether they had a reasonable 
belief for terminating employees.114  Under this reasoning, the 
reasonable belief of disruption standard is appropriate; yet, employees 
in particular fields are constantly disadvantaged because their careers 
involve “close working relationships.”115 
For example, police departments are one workforce where there 
has been an emphasis on deference.116  In Gillis, the Sixth Circuit 
expressed that police departments have “legitimate and powerful 
interests in regulating speech by their employees.”117  As a result, the 
court found that the correctional officers’ memorandum could disrupt 
the legitimate interests of law enforcement because the effects of the 
memorandum’s release could have potentially harmed or led to deaths 
of staff and inmates under their control.118  Another justification courts 
have found for providing deference to police departments is that they 
are “given more latitude” in regards to disciplinary actions because they 
are designated to maintain public safety and order.119  
Similarly, another type of public safety department, fire 
departments, has also been offered heightened deference from 
courts.120  In Grutzmacher, the Court afforded “substantial weight” to the 
fire department’s interests.121  The court found that fire departments 
were interested in promoting solidarity, along with trust and internal 
 
 113 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983). 
 114 See Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 684 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We have long recognized 
‘the importance of deference’ to law enforcement officials when speech threatens to 
undermine the functions of organizations charged with maintaining public safety.”) 
(quoting Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1989)); Grutzmacher v. 
Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that fire companies have an 
interest in promoting workplace efficiency and therefore offering “substantial weight” 
to interest in limiting disharmony). 
 115 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. 
 116 See, e.g., Cherry v. Pickell, 188 F. App’x 465, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n the 
context of police departments, we have emphasized that the court should show 
‘deference to the city’s judgment on the matter of discouraging public dissension within 
its safety forces.’” (quoting Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1989))). 
 117 Gillis, 845 F.3d at 684. 
 118 Id. at 687. 
 119 Graziosi v. City of Greenville Miss., 775 F.3d 731, 740 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
 120 See Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570) (“When lives may be at stake in a fire, an esprit de 
corps is essential to the success of the joint endeavor.  Carping criticism and abrasive 
conduct have no place in a small organization that depends upon common loyalty—
’harmony among coworkers.’”). 
 121 Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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harmony.122  Police departments and fire departments often work 
together to protect the lives of one another and endangered civilians, 
which has been viewed as heightening the need for loyalty, discipline, 
and workplace harmony.123  
Public school teachers have also been viewed as requiring a 
“degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public 
employment.”124  In Munroe, the court articulated that because of this 
unique position, it was important to look at the reactions of both parents 
and students who viewed the teacher’s blog posts, which referenced 
some of her students.125  The court gave deference to their views by 
describing them as “participants in public education, without whose 
cooperation public education as a practical matter cannot function.”126  
Effectively, the interests not of the school teacher or even the school 
district, but rather the interests of non-employees, influenced the 
teacher’s future.127 
Courts’ continuous deference to police departments, fire 
departments, and school systems have, in a way, reversed and further 
complicated the First Amendment framework.  Pickering and its 
progeny moved away from the concept elucidated in McAuliffe v. Mayor 
of New Bedford’s early proclamation that public employees do not have 
a right to free speech.128  While employers should have some level of 
control over their public employees to support workplace efficiency, 
public employees cannot repeatedly lose their right to speak online.  
Public employers should not be allowed to control their employees’ 
speech just because they accept positions as police officers, firefighters, 
or teachers.  As such, a certain modification to the reasonable belief of 
disruption test must be made to balance the disadvantages public 
 
 122 Id.  See also Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Cor., 218 F.3d 337, 355 
(4th Cir. 2000) (“[V]olunteer fire companies have a strong interest in the promotion of 
camaraderie and efficiency, and we thus accord . . . substantial weight for these 
articulated interests.”); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17, 26 
(2d Cir. 1979) (“When lives may be at stake in a fire, an esprit de corps is essential to the 
success of the joint endeavor.”). 
 123 Bennet v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 383 F. Supp. 3d 790, 804 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2019). 
 124 Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 475 (3rd Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2014)).  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. (quoting Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 
2013)). 
 127 See id.  The court also described teachers as acting in loco parentis for students, 
which adds a condition teachers accept when taking on public employment.  Id.  See also 
Craig, 736 F.3d at 1119 (“An employer may have more leeway in restricting the speech 
of an employee whose position requires contact with the public.”). 
 128 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). 
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employees inherently have because of their social media use.  Therefore, 
courts should adopt a modified version of the reasonable belief of 
disruption test to combat this type of deference and simultaneously 
ensure public employees have their constitutionally guaranteed right to 
freedom of speech. 
2.  Defining What It Means to Have a Reasonable Belief of 
Disruption 
Another flaw stemming from the reasonable belief of disruption 
standard is a lack of clarity over what it means for an employer to have 
a reasonable belief to justify adverse employment action.  In Gillis, 
Grutzmacher, and Munroe discussed above, the courts justified their 
decisions to rule in favor of the employer by accepting the employer’s 
reasonable belief of disruption.129  Of course, opponents of the 
reasonable belief of disruption test believe that employers could 
“fabricate a ‘reasonable belief’” to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
articulated standard.130  The standard’s subjectivity may leave public 
employees in vulnerable situations because employers’ decisions are 
based on speculative beliefs.131  Justice O’Connor cautioned in Waters 
that: 
[T]here will often be situations in which reasonable 
employers would disagree about who is to be believed, or how 
much investigation needs to be done, or how much evidence 
is needed to come to a particular conclusion.  In those 
situations, many different courses of action will necessarily be 
reasonable.  Only procedures outside the range of what a 
reasonable manager would use may be condemned as 
unreasonable.132 
Justice O’Connor addressed that there will not always be one 
correct solution to address these issues.133  There is a lack of precision 
that comes along with the reasonable belief of disruption standard 
because there is no exact definition of reasonableness.  The reasonable 
belief of disruption standard parallels the reasonable person standard, 
 
 129 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017); Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 
F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017); Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 478 (3rd 
Cir. 2015). 
 130 Thalia Olaya, Note, Public Employees’ First Amendment Speech Rights in the Social 
Media World: #Fire of #Fire-d, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 476 (2019).  See Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) (offering “substantial weight to 
government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption.”). 
 131 Niewialkouski, supra note 105, at 993–94. 
 132 Waters v. Churchill, 551 U.S. 661, 678 (1994). 
 133 Id. 
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commonly utilized in negligence cases.134  This reasonableness test 
protects the interests of the employers, but it does not offer them 
complete control over terminating their employees by requiring a 
showing of a reasonable belief of disruption.   
One possible solution to reconciling these difficulties in 
determining whether employers had a reasonable belief of disruption is 
mandating that government employers implement social media 
policies.  By doing so, employers would have guidance over what 
employees can and cannot post on social media.135  If employees then 
decided to bring suits, the employers’ social media policies could assist 
courts’ applications of the Pickering balancing test.  If an employee was 
terminated for activity not restricted in the policy, a court will likely lean 
more toward protecting an employee’s speech rights as a matter of 
public concern.136  Alternatively, if an employee’s activity dealt with 
conduct restricted by the policy, then a court would likely find the 
employer’s decision was the result of promoting workplace 
efficiency.137  In applying the Pickering balancing test, courts should be 
more receptive to an employer’s reasonable fear argument when the 
employer can point to a provision of a social media policy that 
specifically prohibits the speech in question. 
V.  RECOMMENDED SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY: WHAT EMPLOYERS CAN DO TO 
RESOLVE THE FLAWS OF THE REASONABLE BELIEF OF DISRUPTION STANDARD 
A social media policy, “together with the employee’s signed 
acknowledgment of receiving it and being bound by its terms, is usually 
the first—and best—line of defense to employee privacy claims.”138  
Social media policies should not overly restrict an employee’s ability to 
utilize social media, but they should also be stringent enough to protect 
workplace integrity.139  Striking the right balance might be challenging 
for employers, but this section will offer guidance on crafting an 
 
 134 Reasonable Person, LEGAL INFORMATION INST. (2020).  The reasonable person is 
“[t]he hypothetical reasonable person [who] behaves in a way that is legally 
appropriate.”  Id. 
 135 Id. (addressing that “[w]e the public want the people with the most knowledge to 
speak on matters of public policy.”). 
 136 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any case 
is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”). 
 137 See id. 
 138 BROWNING, supra note 9, at 87.  
 139 Stacy Rapacon, How Using Social Media Can Get You Fired, CNBC (Feb. 5, 2016, 
10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/05/how-using-social-media-can-get-
you-fired.html. 
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enforceable social media policy that protects both the employer’s and 
employee’s rights.  This section provides suggestions for private and 
public employees when drafting social media policies and considers the 
practices of private and public entities.  First, this section will explore 
the need for concise policies that specifically address what can be 
discussed online.  Next, it will focus on requiring employees to 
distinguish between articulating their views and purporting to 
articulate the views of their employers.  Finally, this section will discuss 
the need to shield speech that touches on matters of public concern. 
A.  Tailoring the Social Media Policy 
To many people, the ability to use social media, including 
throughout the workday, is critical for a job.140  Checking social media is 
more than just a pastime; it is a way to keep up with what is happening 
in the world.141  Public employers should be cautious in limiting 
employees’ social media usage.  Just as the Pickering test proffers, there 
is a need in the modern realm of social media usage to strike a balance 
between a public employee’s interest in discussing matters of public 
concern online and an employer’s interest in maintaining workplace 
harmony.142   
This section discusses the need for employers to draft narrowly 
tailored social media policies.  Having a narrowly tailored social media 
policy in place would benefit both the employee and the employer: it 
would help employees understand what they can post online without 
fear of facing repercussions, and it would afford employers protection 
against unduly skeptical forms of judicial review.  
Employers should be cautious when drafting social media policies 
to avoid incorporating provisions that prohibit employees from posting 
anything at all.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in Liverman critiqued 
the City of Petersburg’s Police Department’s broad social media policy 
that prohibited the distribution of any information “that would tend to 
discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department] or any other City 
 
 140 See NANCY FLYNN, THE SOCIAL MEDIA HANDBOOK: RULES, POLICIES, AND BEST PRACTICES TO 
SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE YOUR ORGANIZATION’S SOCIAL MEDIA PRESENCE, POSTS, AND POTENTIAL 2 
(2012) (‘“Generation Standby’ workers (younger employees who never fully switch off 
from the Internet at work or home) say that they would turn down employment if the 
boss did not allow them to access social networking sites or personal email during 
working hours.”). 
 141 Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News from Social Media, FORBES 
(Oct. 11, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/
more-americans-are-getting-their-news-from-social-media/#52ff79543e17. 
 142 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  
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of Petersburg Department or its employees.”143  The court found the 
policy could potentially affect the public in different ways, such as 
keeping the public from knowing whether the department was running 
safely if employees were unable to engage in online discussions about 
the department.144  The flaws in this policy highlight the need for 
specificity in social media policies, because if the department had 
provided employees with specific examples of issues that could not be 
discussed online, such as high-risk or undercover cases, the court may 
have enforced the department’s social media policy and dismissed the 
employee’s suit.  
Recently, a Washington Post reporter’s tweet about past sexual-
assault allegations against Kobe Bryant led to public uproar.145  The 
reporter, Felicia Sonmez, was placed on leave to determine whether she 
violated the company’s social media policy,146 which required 
journalists to “refrain from writing, tweeting or posting anything—
including photographs or video—that could objectively be perceived as 
reflecting political, racial, sexist, religious or other bias or favoritism.”147  
Even though Sonmez was reinstated because she was subsequently 
found not to have been in “clear and direct violation” of the social media 
policy, this incident demonstrates the need for narrower social media 
policies.148  While the Washington Post’s inclusion of the language 
“objectively be perceived” leans toward a more tailored view of what is 
appropriate online speech, the policy also overly restricts employees 
from speaking on many important topics online.149  While the First 
Amendment’s free speech protections only apply to government 
employees, the Washington Post’s actions illustrate the sweeping effects 
social media activity can have on employers and employees.150 
 
 143 Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 144 Id. at 408.  
 145 See Rachel Abrams, Washington Post Suspends a Reporter After Her Tweets on Kobe 
Bryant, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/business/
media/kobe-bryant-washington-post-felicia-sonmez.html.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Wash. Post Staff, Policies and Standards, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/policies-and-standards/.  
 148 Paul Farhi, Washington Post Clears Reporter Who Tweeted Link to Kobe Bryan Rape 
Allegations, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2020, 10:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/washington-post-clears-reporter-who-tweeted-link-to-kobe-bryant-
rape-allegations/2020/01/28/74728a32-421a-11ea-b5fc-eefa848cde99_story.html.  
 149 Wash. Post Staff, supra note 147. 
 150 See Tom Spiggle, What Felicia Sonmez’s Tweets About Kobe Bryan Tell Us About the 
Free Speech Rights of Employees, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2020, 1:27 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2020/02/04/what-felicia-sonmezs-
recent-tweets-about-kobe-bryant-tell-us-about-the-free-speech-rights-of-
employees/#7b7fa4773af5.  
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Public employers cannot try to control their employees’ online 
speech by developing overly restrictive policies.  It is nearly impossible 
for employers to anticipate all types of social media that could be 
problematic.  This is a potential flaw in creating concise social media 
policies that leave employers in vulnerable situations if they cannot 
predict some form of disruptive speech.151  Employers should focus on 
reaching a balance between advancing their rights and those of their 
employees by drafting narrower social media policies.  Avoiding rash 
terms like “any information ‘that would tend to discredit or reflect 
unfavorably upon’” the employer, or even as the Washington Post 
restricts anything “that could objectively be perceived” as discussing an 
array of topics in a favorable way is one pivotal step to moving away 
from a broad policy.152  By steering clear of such terms, employers can 
minimize their potential liability if former employees bring litigation.153  
Employers can also encourage their employees to use good judgment 
when engaging in online activity and guide employees by designating 
specific topics particular to their fields that should not be discussed.154  
While this may be challenging and unpredictable, employers can always 
update their social media policies and notify employees of changes if 
they find new topics that should not be discussed online.  
B.  Representing One’s Thoughts 
While it is important that public employers protect their 
reputations, their employees also have a competing First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech.  Employees can create personal social media 
accounts and engage in online conversations with other users.  Yet, 
there is still a looming concern of employers that their employees will 
post something potentially destructive online.155  To protect employers 
 
 151 See Susan C. Hudson & Karla K. Roberts, Drafting and Implementing an Effective 
Social Media Policy, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 767, 770–71 (2012). 
 152 See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 2016); Wash. Post 
Staff, supra note 147. 
 153 Michael R. Blum, The Risks of Social Media Use by Employees, and How Public 
Employers Can Create Strong Social Media Policies, FOSTER SWIFT (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.fosterswift.com/communications-Social-Media-Employers-Policy-
Speech.html. 
 154 See Kathy Vanderziel, Challenges and Issues in Creating a Social Media Policy, 
LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 18, 2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporate
counselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2012/08/18/challenges-and-issues-in-
creating-a-social-media-policy.aspx.  
 155 See Benedetto Cristofani, Companies are Increasingly Worried About What Their 
Employees Say, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.economist.com/
international/2020/02/27/companies-are-increasingly-worried-about-what-their-
employees-say (“Employers say they need to restrict the expression of certain views in 
order to create inclusive workplaces.”).  
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from facing the public’s wrath because of this speech, employers should 
require employees to distinguish their views from those of their 
employer.  This may help minimize the backlash employers face.  By 
including this condition in their social media policies, employers will 
allow employees to offer their views online but also demonstrate to 
other users that those are their personal views.  
In the private employment context, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) has considered whether the requirement that employees 
use personal disclaimers on their social media posts was enforceable.156  
In August 2019, the NLRB reviewed CVS Health’s requirement that 
employees use personal disclaimers such as, “tweets my own,” “views 
my own,” or “[t]he[se] opinions . . .  are the personal opinions of the 
original authors, not those of CVS Health.”157  The NLRB found the policy 
mandating employees to use disclaimers lawful because employees 
could place these requirements on their social media accounts, rather 
than each individualized post to demonstrate that their online activity 
was solely their views.158  While this is in the private employment realm, 
the NLRB’s reasoning could also apply to public employees.  It would be 
simple for employees to include a general provision in their profiles, 
emphasizing that these are their individual views.   
If a public employee had one of these disclaimers on his or her 
account and was subsequently terminated for online activity, this type 
of provision would ease the challenges courts face when conducting the 
Pickering analysis.  Disclaimers are critical because they inform the 
public that the employee’s post or comment was “made in the author’s 
individual capacity and express[ed] that individual’s opinions and 
beliefs, not those of the employer.”159  With the majority of courts 
applying the reasonable belief of disruption standard,160 mandating that 
employees use a disclaimer would help illustrate that the employer 
lacked a reasonable belief that disruption could occur because the 
online activity solely represented the employee’s views.  As there is 
often difficulty in separating an employee’s personal and work views, 
 
 156 Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc. Gen. Counsel U.S. Gov’t Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., to Mori Rubin, Reg’l Dir. 10–11 (Aug. 15, 2019) (on file with NLRB), 
https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582d1e93c.   
 157 Id.  Other provisions that will not be analyzed discussed refraining from utilizing 
social media to make employment recommendations and a general caution to use social 
media appropriately by refraining from discussing complaints that “could be resolved 
more constructively though the appropriate channels consistent with the Company’s 
commitment to maintain a diverse and safe workplace.”  Id. at 11.  The NLRB found both 
provisions to be facially lawful.  Id. at 11–12. 
 158 Id. at 11. 
 159 Hudson & Roberts, supra note 151, at 772.  
 160 See Section 0.  
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the usage of a disclaimer may minimize the likelihood that an 
employee’s social media activity is read as the shared view of his or her 
employer.161  These types of disclaimers would be particularly effective 
when employees use online platforms to discuss their employers or 
topics that concern their employer’s work.162  There remains the 
concern that an individual’s employer could be identified by 
information or other posts located within social media accounts.163  
Even though this is a potential concern, requiring that employees place 
disclaimers either on controversial posts or permanently placed on 
their social media accounts will help advance both the employer and the 
employee’s interests.  
C.  Addressing a Matter of Public Concern  
As previously noted, there is a significant need for narrowly 
construed social media policies that offer public employees the chance 
to engage in online discussions on social media.164  While public 
employees have a First Amendment right to free speech,165 the Pickering 
test mandates that the speech deals with a matter of public concern.166  
This appears to be a straightforward requirement, but there is a need 
for employers to describe in their social media policies the extent 
speech must address matters of public concern to be considered 
protected.  Since Americans now “are arguably more socially and 
politically conscious than previous generations and actively use social 
media to convey their thoughts, debate important topics, and fight for 
causes,” employers need to vigilantly define what it means to be a 
matter of public concern.167 
Some topics address matters of public concern but should not be 
discussed online to protect the employer’s interests.  Confidential 
information about the employer, if discussed online, could affect the 
 
 161 See William A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and Public 
Sector Labor Law, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 427, 489 (2013). 
 162 It May Be Time to Update Your Workplace Social Media Policy…, GENERAL COUNSEL 
PC (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.generalcounsellaw.com/it-may-be-time-to-update-
your-workplace-social-media-policy/.   
 163 See Melanie Pinola, Managing Your Personal and Professional Online Profiles, 
LIFEWIRE (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.lifewire.com/social-networking-strategies-for-
personal-and-professional-use-2378017 (proposing different strategies for employees 
if they want to use social media for both personal and work-related purposes).   
 164 See supra Section V.0. 
 165 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 166 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–48 (1983). 
 167 S. Kumar, Why Monitoring Employees’ Social Media is a Bad Idea, TIME (May 22, 
2015, 11:41 AM), https://time.com/3894276/social-media-monitoring-work/. 
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employer’s business or negatively affect its reputation.168  To protect 
confidential information and remind employees about the need for 
confidentiality regarding certain discussions, employers should 
integrate their confidentiality policy into their social media policy if one 
already exists.169  If one does not exist, employers should include a 
provision in the social media policy that informs employees of specific 
topics that should not be discussed online because of its confidential 
nature.   
But if a public employee’s speech does not discuss confidential 
information, the social media policy should include a provision 
explaining that speech discussing matters of public concern is protected.  
For example, a former dental assistant recently alleged she was 
terminated for her Facebook posts supporting President Donald 
Trump.170  Her posts led to a man leaving a negative review on the 
Facebook page of the dentist’s office, addressing that the employee 
should not be “spouting racist comments on Facebook.”171  While this 
stems from the private employment realm, this incident serves as a 
cautionary tale for both employers and employees.  The employee 
exercised her First Amendment right to free speech by supporting a 
political view, but one online user believed this was the shared view of 
the dentist’s office.172   
By including a provision that allows employees to discuss matters 
of public concern, even if the online activity only slightly relates to 
something of the public’s interest, employers will be advancing the goals 
of the Pickering test.  An example of a provision discussing public 
concern was offered in Liverman.173  The provision provided officers the 
ability to discuss matters of public concern, as long as the comments did 
not “disrupt the workforce, interfere with important working 
relationships or efficient workflow, or undermine public confidence in 
the officer.”174  The court did not uphold the City of Petersburg’s social 
 
 168 See Hudson & Roberts, supra note 151, at 782.  
 169 Id.   
 170 Joshua Rhett Miller, Wisconsin Woman Claims She was Fired for Pro-Trump 
Facebook Posts, NY POST (Jan. 16, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/
16/wisconsin-woman-claims-she-was-fired-for-pro-trump-facebook-posts/. 
 171 Id.  
 172 It is important to note that even though she had a right to freedom of speech, since 
this was a private employee, she did not have protection from being terminated by her 
employer for her online activity.  
 173 Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 174 Id. 
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media policy, but noted that this portion of the policy offered a narrow 
restriction.175   
Employers should include a provision, like the employer in 
Liverman did, to ensure that employees are granted an ability to discuss 
matters that deal with public concern online.  Concerns may arise as to 
what level the speech must engage in public concern to warrant First 
Amendment protection, but this Comment does not attempt to define a 
bright-line rule for what speech reaches this level.  Employers can 
include examples of topics that would constitute a matter of public 
concern, such as working conditions and wages, but can also explain 
that the list is non-exhaustive.  This would protect both the employer’s 
and employee’s interests by leaving both open to demonstrating that an 
employee’s speech does or does not discuss a matter of public concern.  
Finally, employers should ensure that they include examples of how 
speech could affect the overall workplace to show employees the 
significant effect their speech can have.  In doing so, employers will 
educate employees on what they need to be cautious about posting on 
social media. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Public employees have a fundamental right to use social media in 
their daily lives.176  Employees should have the ability to post, comment, 
or “like” on social media sites.  Employers also have a justified interest 
in protecting their reputation and avoiding backlash from their 
employee’s online activity.  Lower courts have attempted to address the 
interests of both government employers and their employees by 
applying the legal framework that had been developed by the Supreme 
Court beginning in Pickering v. Board of Education.  This Comment 
delved into the flaws of Pickering and its progeny that resulted in a 
circuit split among courts over whether the Pickering balancing test 
required employers to demonstrate proof that the employee’s social 
media activity actually disrupted the workplace, or merely that 
employers had a reasonable belief that disruption could occur from the 
speech.  
With most circuits adopting the reasonable belief of disruption 
standard, this standard should uniformly be applied by all circuits for 
cases involving social media.  The progression of technology could not 
have been anticipated; therefore, the constitutional framework, 
 
 175 Id. at 409.  
 176 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (emphasizing that 
“to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in 
the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights”). 
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including that of the Pickering test, must be modified.  By modifying the 
reasonable belief of disruption test, employers will not be unfairly 
advantaged by having the ability to preemptively terminate employees 
for any questionable social media activity.  Rather, by requiring 
employers to incorporate concise social media policies, employees will 
have guidance for what they can post on social media.  Implementing 
social media policies will also allow employers to predetermine specific 
topics they do not want employees to discuss online.  
Social media usage is not going away anytime soon.  Therefore, 
employees cannot lose the opportunity to engage in “the modern public 
square.”177  By retaining the reasonable belief of disruption standard but 
modifying it to require employers to have social media policies in place, 
employers and employees will have both of their interests balanced.  
Implementing social media policies is a simple and cost-efficient way to 
modify the legal framework that governs public employee speech 
claims.  Thus, to protect employees’ ability to use social media, 
employers must detail their rights through social media policies.  
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